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1 Introduction
There exists a large strand of literature on economic growth, climate change and tech-
nological improvements (see for instance Bosetti et al., 2006 and 2009; Edenhofer et al.,
2005 and 2006; Gerlagh 2006; Gerlagh and Van Der Zwaan 2006; Nordhaus, 2008; Popp,
2006a and 2006b). In these models, the analysis usually focuses on the optimal trajectories
and their comparison with the business-as-usual scenario. For many reasons that will be
discussed below, it may be relevant to examine some intermediate cases between these two
polar ones. Nevertheless, a decentralized economy framework is required to perform such
an analysis. The main objective of this paper is to complete the literature mentioned above
by setting up a general equilibrium analysis that allows to compute any equilibrium in the
decentralized economy.
A full description of the set of equilibria offers several advantages. Under a positive
point of view, it allows to examine how the economy reacts to policy changes. We can
thus look at the individual effects of a given policy instrument as well as a given subset
of them, the other ones being kept unchanged. This will give some insights on the com-
plementarity/substitutability of public tools. Under a normative point of view, as usual,
this approach allows for the computation of the economic instruments that restore the
first-best optimum. However, because of budgetary, socioeconomic or political constraints,
the enforcement of first-best optimum can be difficult to achieve for the policy-maker that
would rather implement second-best solutions. Finally, another advantage is the possibility
to compare the outcome of a cost-benefit analysis in a partial equilibrium approach (e.g.
Gerlagh et al., 2008) with the one obtained from a general equilibrium framework.
In line with the "top-down" approach and based on the DICE and ENTICE-BR models
(Nordhaus, 2008, and Popp, 2006a, respectively), we develop an endogenous growth model
in which energy services can be produced from a polluting non-renewable resource as
well as a clean backstop. Moreover, we assume that carbon emissions can be partially
released thanks to CCS (Carbon Capture and Storage) technology. We introduce three
R&D sectors, the first one improving the efficiency of energy production, the second one,
the efficiency of the backstop and the last one, the efficiency of the sequestration process.
With this respect, we have to consider two types of market failures: the pollution associated
with the atmospheric release of carbon and the research spillovers in each R&D sector.
For this matter, in the decentralized equilibrium, we introduce two kinds of economic
2
policy instruments in accordance: an environmental tax on the carbon emissions and a
research subsidy for the energy, backstop and CCS R&D sectors. There is an equilibrium
associated to each vector of instruments. Clearly, when public instruments are optimally
set, the equilibrium of the decentralized economy coincides with the first best optimum.
In particular, we provide a full expression of the optimal carbon tax and we analyze its
dynamic properties. As in Goulder and Mathai (2000), we show that the tax can evolve
non-monotonically over time and we characterize the driving forces that make it either
growing or declining.
At this point, three remarks can be formulated. The first one is related to the way
we deal with R&D sectors in the decentralized framework. In the standard endogenous
growth theory (Aghion and Howitt, 1992; Romer, 1990...), the production of an innovation
is associated with a particular intermediate good. Research is funded by the monopoly
profits of intermediate producers who benefit from an exclusive right, like a patent, for
the production and the sale of these goods. In this paper, to simplify the analysis, we do
not explicitly introduce tangible intermediate goods in research sectors, as it is done for
instance by Gerlagh and Lise (2005), Edenhofer et al. (2006) and Popp (2006a). Then,
we adopt the shortcut proposed by Grimaud and Rougé (2008) in the case of growth
models with polluting resources and environmental concerns. This approach is based on
the comparison between the socially optimal value of innovations and the private one, which
emerges at the decentralized equilibrium. Several empirical studies (Jones and Williams,
1998; Popp, 2006a) find that this last value is lower than the former one. This is justified
in the standard literature by the presence of some failures that prevent the decentralized
equilibrium to implement the first-best optimum. We use these studies to build the "laisser-
faire" equilibrium. Finally, research subsidies can be enforced in order to reduce the gap
between these social and private values1.
The second remark is a technical one which concerns the computation of the eco-
nomic variables, quantities and prices, in the decentralized economy. As usual, the first
step consists in studying the behavior of agents and, under market clearing conditions, in
characterizing the equilibrium trajectory. In a second step, we show that there exists an
1According to the OECD Science, Technology and R&D Statistics, publicly-funded energy R&D in
2004 among OECD countries amounted to 9.72 billion US$, which represented 4% of overall public R&D
budgets. In the United States, energy investments from the private sector have shrunk during the last
decade; governmental funding currently represents 76% of total US energy R&D expenditures (Nemet and
Kammen, 2007).
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optimization program whose the solution is the same as the equilibrium one. This allows
the numerical computation of any equilibrium trajectories in a calibrated model.
The last remark is about the particular decarbonisation technology considered. As
recommended by the IPCC, abatement technologies reveal crucial for the implementation
of a cost-effective climate change mitigation policy. Such abatement technologies notably
include renewable energy but also the possibility to reduce the carbon footprint of fossil
fuel burning. According to the IPCC (2005), carbon capture and storage (CCS) offers
promising prospects. This process consists in separating the carbon dioxide from other
flux gases during the process of energy production. It is particularly adapted to large-scale
centralized power stations but may also indirectly apply to non electric energy supply
(cf. Hoffert et al., 2002). Once captured, the gases are then being disposed into various
reservoirs, such as depleted oil and gas fields, depleted coal mines, deep saline aquifers, or
oceans.
Next, we provide some numerical illustrations by calibrating the model to fit the world
2005 data. As suggested by the theory, the optimal carbon tax is generally non-monotonic
over time. We find that the implementation of this tax alone leads to the expected effects
on the fossil fuel use (and then on carbon emissions), but it does not provide incentive
enough to hardly stimulate R&D activities. Similarly, research policies alone have high
impacts on R&D activities, but their effect on the atmospheric carbon accumulation is very
low. In other words, the crossed effects of each policy instrument are weak. Moreover, the
simultaneous use of these two types of public tools reinforces the individual role of each one,
thus revealing high complementarity between them. For instance, we observe numerically
that the simultaneous implementation of a carbon tax and appropriate R&D subsidies can
strengthen the role of the backstop and of the CCS. Finally, the recourse to these two
abatement options is reinforced by a more ambitious carbon tax, in order to stabilize the
atmospheric carbon concentration for instance.
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the decentralized economy and
studies the behavior of agents in each sector. In section 3, i) we characterize the decentral-
ized equilibrium, ii) we identify the maximization program associated with this equilibrium,
iii) we characterize the first-best optimum solutions, and iv) we compute the appropriate
public tools that implement the optimum. In section 4, we present the calibration of the
model and we derive a selection of numerical results. We conclude in section 5.
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2 The decentralized economy
The model is mainly based on ENTICE-BR (Popp, 2006a) and on the last version of
DICE (Nordhaus, 2008). We consider a worldwide economy containing four production
sectors: final output, energy services, fossil fuel and carbon-free backstop. The fossil fuel
combustion process releases CO2 flows which accumulate into the atmosphere, inducing a
rise of the average temperatures. Feedbacks on the economy are captured by a damage
function measuring the continuous and gradual losses in terms of final output due to global
warming (i.e. GWP losses). Moreover, an atmospheric carbon concentration cap can be
eventually introduced to take into account the high levels of uncertainty and irreversibility
that are generally avoided by the standard damage function. Industrial emissions can be
partly sequestered and stored in carbon reservoirs owing to a CCS device. The production
of final energy services, backstop and CCS require specific knowledge provided by three
directed R&D sectors (in the sense of Acemoglu, 2002). We assume that all sectors, except
the R&D's ones, are perfectly competitive. Finally, in order to correct the two types of
distortions involved by the model  pollution and research spillovers  we introduce two
types of policy tools: an environmental tax on the fossil fuel use and a subsidy for each
R&D sector. Note that, because of CCS, the tax applies on the residual carbon emissions
after sequestration and it is thus disconnected from the fossil resource use.
The model is sketched in Figure 1. Specific functional forms and calibration details are
described in appendix A4. The following subsection derives the individual behaviors.
2.1 Behavior of agents
2.1.1 The final good sector
The production of a quantity Qt of final good depends on three endogenous elements:
capital Kt, energy services Et, and a scaling factor Ωt which accounts from climate-related
damages, as discussed below. It also depends on exogenous inputs: the total factor produc-
tivity At and the population level Lt, growing at exogenous rates gA,t and gL,t respectively.
We write Qt = Q(Kt, Et, Lt, At,Ωt), where the production function Q(.) is assumed to have
the standard properties (increasing and concave in each argument).
Normalizing to one the price of the final output and denoting by pE,t, wt, rt and
δ, the price of energy services, the real wage, the interest rate2 and the depreciation
2We assume here that the representative household holds the capital and rents it to firms at a rental
price Rt. Standard arbitrage conditions imply Rt = rt + δ.
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Figure 1: Description of the model
rate of capital, respectively, the instantaneous profit of producers is expressed as ΠQt =
Qt − pE,tEt − wtLt − (rt + δ)Kt. Maximization of this profit function with respect to Kt,
Lt and Et, leads to the following first-order conditions:
QK − (rt + δ) = 0 (1)
QL − wt = 0 (2)
QE − pE,t = 0 (3)
where JX stands for the partial derivative of function J(.) with respect to X.
2.1.2 The energy-CCS sector
At each time t, the amount Et of energy services is produced from two primary energies  a
fossil fuel Ft and a backstop energy source Bt  and from a stock HE,t of specific knowledge
which can improve the energy efficiency. The energy supply is then Et = E(Ft, Bt, HE,t),
where E(.) is assumed to be increasing and concave in each argument.
The economic and climatic systems are linked in the model by anthropogenic CO2
emissions, generated by fossil fuel burning. Without CCS, the carbon flow released into
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the atmosphere would be equal to ξFt, where ξ is the unitary carbon content of fossil fuel.
We postulate that, at each date t, the CCS device allows a reduction of these emissions by
an amount St, 0 ≤ St ≤ ξFt and, for the sake of simplicity, that CCS activities are part of
the energy sector. To change emissions into stored carbon, the sequestration device needs
specific investment spendings, IS,t, and knowledge, HS,t. The CCS technology then writes
S(Ft, IS,t, HS,t), with S(.) increasing and concave in each argument3. Note that in our
model, we consider neither limited capacity of carbon sinks nor leakage problems. These
questions are addressed, for instance, by Lafforgue et al. (2008) and Keller et al. (2007)
respectively.
Denoting by pF,t and pB,t the fossil fuel and backstop prices, and by τt the unitary
carbon tax on the flow of carbon emissions (ξFt − St), the energy producer chooses Ft, Bt
and IS,t that maximizes its instantaneous profit ΠEt = pE,tEt − pF,tFt − pB,tBt − IS,t −
τt(ξFt − St). The first order conditions write:
pE,tEF − pF,t − τt(ξ − SF ) = 0 (4)
pE,tEB − pB,t = 0 (5)
−1 + τtSIS = 0 (6)
Condition (6) equalizes the private cost of one unit of stockpiled carbon, 1/SIS , with the
carbon tax. Moreover, the extended unit cost of fossil fuel use, including the fuel price,
the environmental penalty and the sequestration cost, can be defined as:
cF,t = pF,t +
τt(ξFt − St)
Ft
+
IS,t
Ft
(7)
2.1.3 The primary energy sectors
At each time t, the extraction flow Ft of fossil resource depends on specific productive
investments, IF,t, and on the cumulated past extraction, Zt. As in Popp (2006a) or in
Gerlagh and Lise (2005), we do not explicitly model an initial fossil resource stock that is
exhausted, but we focus on the increase in the extraction cost as the resource is depleted.
We denote by Zt the amount of resource extracted from the initial date up to t:
Zt =
∫ t
0
Fsds⇒ Z˙t = Ft (8)
3In a Romer model with tangible intermediate goods, the energy and CCS production functions would
write Et = E
[
Ft, Bt,
∫ HE,t
0
fE(xEj,t)dj
]
and St = S
[
Ft, IS,t,
∫HS,t
0
fS(xSj,t)dj
]
respectively, where xnj,t is
the jth intermediate good and fn(.) is an increasing and strictly concave function, for n = {E,S}.
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The fossil fuel extraction function is denoted by F (IF,t, Zt), where F (.) is increasing and
concave in IF , decreasing and convex in Z. The fuel producer must choose {IF,t}∞t=0
that maximizes
∫∞
0 Π
F
t e
− ∫ t0 rsdsdt subject to (8), where its instantaneous profit is ΠFt =
pF,tFt − IF,t. Denoting by ηt the multiplier associated with (8), the static and dynamic
first-order conditions are:
(pF,tFIF − 1)e−
∫ t
0 rsds + ηtFIF = 0 (9)
pF,tFZe
− ∫ t0 rsds + ηtFZ = −η˙t (10)
Combining these two equations, and using the transversality condition limt→∞ ηtZt = 0,
we get the following fossil fuel price expression:
pF,t =
1
FIF
−
∫ ∞
t
FZ
FIF
e−
∫ s
t rxdxds (11)
Differentiating (11) with respect to time, it comes:
p˙F,t = rt
(
pF,t − 1
FIF
)
+
1
FIF
(
FZ −
˙FIF
FIF
)
(12)
which reads as a generalized version of the Hotelling rule in the case of an extraction
technology given by function F (.). In particular, if the marginal productivity of investment
spendings coincides with the average productivity, i.e. if FIF = F (.)/IF , then it is easy
to see that (12) reduces to p˙F,t = rt(pF,t − 1/FIF ). In the limit case where the marginal
productivity tends to infinity, i.e. the marginal extraction cost tends to zero, one gets the
elementary Hotelling rule, p˙F,t/pF,t = rt.
The backstop production functionB(IB,t, HB,t) is assumed to be increasing and concave
in the investment spending IB,t and in the specific stock of knowledge HB,t.
4 Maximization
of the profit ΠBt = pB,tB(IB,t, HB,t)− IB,t, yields the following first-order condition:
pB,tBIB − 1 = 0 (13)
2.1.4 The R&D sectors
As already mentioned in the introduction, R&D sectors generally face several distortions.
Jones and Williams (2000) identify four of them: i) the duplication effect : the R&D sec-
tor does not account for the redundancy of some research projects; ii) the intertemporal
spillover effect : inventors do not account for that ideas they produce are used to produce
4Again, in a model with tangible intermediate goods, the backstop technology would write Bt =
B
[
IB,t,
∫ HB,t
0
g(xBi,t)di
]
.
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new ideas; iii) the appropriability effect : inventors appropriate only a part of the social
value they create; iv) the creative-destruction effect. The global effect resulting from these
distortions explains why the social value of an innovation is generally different from the
private one. On this point, there does not exist a clear theoretical consensus emerging
from the standard literature on endogenous growth. For instance, in the Romer's model
(1990) with horizontal innovations, the private value is lower than the social one. How-
ever, Benassy (1998) showed that a slight modification of the Romer's model can lead to
the opposite result. In the Aghion and Howitt model with vertical innovations (1992),
the private value can be either larger or smaller than the social one, depending upon the
parameters of the model.
However, there is an empirical evidence for a smaller private value. Jones and Williams
(1998) estimate that research investments are at least four times below what would be
socially optimal (on this point, see also Popp, 2006a, or Hart, 2008). In the following, we
base our analysis on this observation.
There are three stocks of knowledge, each associated with a specific R&D sector (i.e.
the energy, the backstop and the CCS ones). We consider that each innovation is a non-
rival, indivisible and infinitely durable piece of knowledge (for instance, a scientific report,
a data base, a software algorithm...) which is simultaneously used by the sector which
produces the good i and by the R&D sector i, i = {B,E, S}. Thus, an innovation is
not directly embodied into tangible intermediate goods and it cannot be financed by the
sale of these goods. To circumvent this obstacle, one solution would consist in assuming
that firms simultaneously produce output and undertake research. In that case, under
perfect competition and constant returns to rival inputs, once these inputs have been payed,
residual profits are nil. An imperfect competition framework would thus be required to
generate positive profits allowing the firms to buy innovations, as it is done in Grimaud
and Rouge (2008). This type of development would lead to several difficulties which are
out of the scope of the present study. Moreover, Grimaud and Rouge (2008) show that
Cournot competition does note prevent optimality when the labor supply is exogenous5,
which is the case in our model.
In order to avoid any problem, we adopt a shortcut aiming at directly valuing innova-
tions. Basically, we proceed in three steps: i) In each research sector, we determine the
5Under Cournot competition, the real wage is lower than the optimal one, which implies an income
transfer from labor to capital activities. However, since we assume a single representative agent with
exogenous labor supply, this transfer has no effect on the equilibrium quantities.
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social value of an innovation. Since an innovation is a non-rival good, this social value is the
sum of the marginal profitabilities of this innovation in each sector using it. ii) Because of
the failures mentioned above, the private (or effective) value in the absence research policy
is lower than the social one. iii) The research sectors are eventually subsidized in order to
reduce the gap between these two values.
Let us apply this three-steps procedure to the backstop R&D sector for instance. Each
innovation produced by this sector is used by this R&D sector itself as well as by the
backstop production sector. Thus, at each date t, the instantaneous social value of this
innovation is v¯B,t = v¯BB,t + v¯
HB
B,t , where v¯
B
B,t and v¯
HB
B,t are the marginal profitabilities of this
innovation in the backstop production sector and in the backstop R&D sector, respectively.
The social value of this innovation at t, or equivalently the optimal value at t of an infinitely
lived patent, is V¯B,t =
∫∞
t v¯B,se
− ∫ st rxdxds. The same procedure applies for any R&D sector
i, i = {B,E, S}. We denote by γi, 0 < γi < 1, the rate of appropriability of the innovation
value by the market, i.e. the share of the social value which is effectively paid to the
innovator, and by σi (assumed constant for the sake of simplicity) the subsidy rate that
government can eventually apply. Note that if σi = 1− γi, the effective value matches the
social one. The instantaneous effective value (including subsidy) is:
vi,t = (γi + σi)v¯i,t (14)
and the intertemporal effective value at date t is:
Vi,t =
∫ ∞
t
vi,se
− ∫ st rxdxds (15)
Differentiating (15) with respect to time leads to the usual arbitrage relation:
rt =
V˙i,t
Vi,t
+
vi,t
Vi,t
, ∀i = {B,E, S} (16)
which equates the rate of return on the financial market to the rate of return on the R&D
sector i.
We can now analyze the R&D sector behavior. We assume that the dynamics of the
knowledge stock Hi,t is governed by the following innovation function H
i(.):
H˙i,t = H i(Ri,t, Hi,t) (17)
where Ri,t is the R&D investment into sector i. Function H
i(.) is assumed to be increasing
and concave in each argument6. At each time t, sector i supplies the flow of innovations
6As previously, in a model with tangible intermediate goods, (17) would be replaced by H˙i,t =
Hi
[
Ri,t,
∫Hi,t
0
h(xHi,t)di
]
.
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H˙i,t at price Vi,t, so that its profit function is ΠHit = Vi,tH
i(Ri,t, Hi,t)−Ri,t. The first-order
condition implies:
Vi,t =
1
H iRi
(18)
Using (18), we compute the marginal profitability of innovations in R&D sector i as:
v¯Hii,t =
∂ΠHit
∂Hi,t
= Vi,tH iHi =
H iHi
H iRi
(19)
Finally, from the expressions of ΠBt and Π
E
t , the marginal profitabilities of a backstop, en-
ergy and CCS innovation in the production sectors using them, are given respectively
by v¯BB,t = ∂Π
B
t /∂HB,t = BHB/BIB , v¯
E
E,t = ∂Π
E
t /∂HE,t = EHE/EBBIB and v¯
E
S,t =
∂ΠEt /∂HS,t = τtSHS . Therefore, the instantaneous effective values (including subsidies) of
innovations are:
vB,t = (γB + σB)
(
BHB
BIB
+
HBHB
HBRB
)
(20)
vE,t = (γE + σE)
(
EHE
EBBIB
+
HEHE
HERE
)
(21)
vS,t = (γS + σS)
(
τtSHS +
HSHS
HSRS
)
(22)
2.1.5 The household and the government
Denoting by Ct the consumption at time t, by U(.) the instantaneous utility function
(assumed to have the standard properties) and by ρ > 0 the pure rate of time preferences,
households maximize the welfare function W =
∫∞
0 U(Ct)e
−ρdt subject to its dynamic
budget constraint:
K˙t = rtKt + wtLt + Πt − Ct − T at (23)
where Πt is the total profits gained in the economy and T at is a lump-sum tax (subsidy-free)
that allows to balance the budget constraint of the government. This maximization leads
to the standard Keynes-Ramsey rule:
ρ− U˙
′(Ct)
U ′(Ct)
= ρ+ tgC,t = rt ⇒ U ′(Ct) = U ′(C0)eρt−
∫ t
0 rsds (24)
where t is the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution of consumption, and
gC,t is the instantaneous growth rate of consumption.
Assuming that the government's budget constraint is balanced at each time t (i.e. the
sum of the various taxes equals R&D subsidies), then we have:
T at + τt(ξFt − St) =
∑
i
Subi,t, i = {B,E, S} (25)
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where Subi,t denotes the amount of subsidy distributed to R&D sector i:
Subi,t =
[∫ ∞
t
(
σi
γi + σi
)
vi,se
− ∫ st rxdxds
]
H i(Ri,t, Hi,t) (26)
Finally, the balance equation of the final output writes:
Qt = Ct + IF,t + IB,t + IS,t + IK,t +RE,t +RB,t +RS,t (27)
where IK,t is the instantaneous investment in capital, given by:
IK,t = K˙t + δKt (28)
Hence, in our worldwide economy, the final output is devoted to aggregated consumption,
fossil fuel production, backstop production, CCS, capital accumulation and R&D.
2.2 The environment and damages
Let Gt be the atmospheric carbon concentration at time t and ζ, ζ > 0, the natural rate of
decay. The increase in Gt drives the global mean temperature away from a given state, here
the 1900 level. The difference between this state and the present global mean temperature,
denoted by Tt, is taken here as the index of anthropogenic climate change. The climate
dynamics can thus be captured by the following system:
G˙t = ξFt − St − ζGt (29)
T˙t = Φ(Gt)−mTt, m > 0 (30)
where Φ(.) is a simplified radiative forcing function, assumed to be increasing and concave
in G, and m is a parameter of climatic inertia7.
Global warming generates economic damages that are measured, by convention, in
terms of final output losses through the scaling factor Ω(Tt), with Ω′(.) < 0. In addition
to the damage reflected by Ωt, we will possibly be induced to impose a stabilization cap
on the carbon pollution stock that society can not overshoot (see for instance Chakravorty
et al., 2006):
Gt ≤ G¯, ∀t ≥ 0 (31)
7In the analytical treatment of the model, we assume, for the sake of clarity, that the carbon cycle
through atmosphere and oceans as well as the dynamic interactions between atmospheric and oceanic
temperatures, are captured by the reduced form (29) and (30). However, in the numerical simulations, we
adopt the full characterization of the climate module coming from the last version of DICE (Nordhaus,
2008).
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This additional constraint can be justified by the fact that the social damage function
is not able to reflect the entire environmental damages, but only part of it. In reality,
uncertainty in the climatic consequences of global warming can imply some discontinuities
in the damage, such as natural disasters or other strong irreversibilities, that are not taken
into account by the standard functional representation of the damage.
3 Decentralized equilibrium and welfare analysis
3.1 Characterization of the decentralized equilibrium
From the previous analysis of individual behaviors, we can now study the set of equilibria.
A particular equilibrium is associated with each quadruplet of policies {σB, σE , σS , τt}∞t=0.
It is defined as a vector of quantity trajectories {Qt,Kt, Et, ...}∞t=0 and a vector of price
profiles {rt, pE,t, ...}∞t=0 such that: i) firms maximize profits, ii) the representative household
maximizes utility, iii) markets of private (i.e. rival) goods are perfectly competitive and
cleared, iv) in each R&D sectors i, innovators receive a share (γi + σi) of the social value
of innovations. Such an equilibrium is characterized by the set of equations given by
Proposition 1 below. Clearly, as analyzed in the following subsection, if the policy tools
are set to their optimal levels, these equations also characterize the first-best optimum
together with the system of prices that implements it.
Proposition 1 At each time t, for a given quadruplet of policies {σB, σE , σS , τt}∞t=0, the
equilibrium in the decentralized economy is characterized by the following seven-equations
system:
QEEF − τt(ξ − SF )− 1
FIF
=
−1
U ′(Ct)
∫ ∞
t
FZ
FIF
U ′(Cs)e−ρ(s−t)ds (32)
QEEB =
1
BIB
(33)
1
SIS
= τt (34)
QK − δ = ρ+ tgC,t (35)
(γB + σB)
(
BHBH
B
RB
BIB
+HBHB
)
− H˙
B
RB
HBRB
= ρ+ tgC,t (36)
(γE + σE)
(
EHEH
E
RE
EBBIB
+HEHE
)
− H˙
E
RE
HERE
= ρ+ tgC,t (37)
(γS + σS)
(
τtSHSH
S
RS
+HSHS
)− H˙SRS
HSRS
= ρ+ tgC,t (38)
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The associated system of prices
{
r∗t , w∗t , p∗E,t, p
∗
F,t, p
∗
B,t, V
∗
i,t
}∞
t=0
is obtained from the equa-
tions (1), (2), (3), (11), (13) and (18), respectively.
Proof. See Appendix A1.
Equation (32) is an arbitrage condition that equalizes the marginal net profit from
the increase by one unit of fossil fuel extraction (LHS) to the total marginal gain if there
is no additional extraction (RHS)8. Equation (33) tells that the marginal productivity
of the backstop (LHS) equals its marginal cost (RHS). As already mentioned, equation
(34) formalizes the incentive effect of the carbon tax on the decision to invest in CCS.
Equation (35) characterizes the standard trade-off between capital Kt and consumption
Ct. Equation (36) (resp. (37) and (38)) characterizes the same kind of trade-off between
specific investment into backstop R&D sector, RB,t (resp. energy R&D sector, RE,t, and
CCS R&D sector, RS,t) and consumption. Obviously, the marginal return of each specific
stock of knowledge Hi depends on the associated rate of subsidy σi.
3.2 The decentralized equilibrium under maximization form
In order to solve numerically the market outcome, we show that it is possible to transform
the decentralized problem described above into a single maximization program. Proposition
2 explains how to proceed.
Proposition 2 Solving the following program (we drop time subscripts for notational con-
venience):
max
{C,Ri,Ij ,i={B,E,S},j={F,E,S}}
∫ ∞
0
U(C)e−ρtdt subject to:
K˙ = Q {K,E[B(IB, HB], F (IF , Z), HE ], L,A,Ω} − C − δK −
∑
i
Ri −
∑
j
Ij
−τ {ξF (IF , Z)− S[F (IF , Z), IS , HS ]} ,
H˙i = (γi + σi)H i(Ri, Hi),
and Z˙ = F (IF , Z)
leads to the same system of equations, (32)-(38), than in Proposition 1.
8If extraction increases by one unit, the associated revenue is QEEF and firms face two kinds of costs:
the extraction cost, 1/FIF , and the pollution cost, τ(ξ − SF ). Conversely, if no more fossil resource
is extracted during the time interval dt, this generates an instantaneous gain due to the diminution in
specific investment spending IF corresponding to (dIF /dt)/F |dF=0 = −FZ/FIF . Multiplying this term by
the marginal utility and integrating from t to ∞ with the discount rate ρ gives the total gain in terms
of utility. Finally, dividing by U ′(C), this expression gives the gain in terms of output as specified in the
RHS of (32).
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Proof. See Appendix A2.
Proposition 2 can be read in fact as the welfare maximization program of a represen-
tative agent who would own all firms (final sector, energy-CCS, fossil fuel, backstop and
R&D) and who would face the same incentive policies (carbon tax, research subsidies)
than firms in the decentralized economy. This approach is the same than the one followed
by Sinclair (1994) who also writes the market equilibrium under maximization form. The
main difference with our model is that he assumes an exogenous rate of Hicks-neutral
technical change.
3.3 First-best optimum and implementation
The social planner problem consists in choosing {Ct, Ri,t, Ij,t}∞t=0 that maximizes the social
welfareW , subject to the various technological constraints, the output allocation constraint
(27), the state equations (8), (17), (28), (29), (30), and finally, the ceiling constraint (31).
After eliminating the co-state variables, the first-order conditions leads to Proposition 3
below.
Proposition 3 At each time t, an optimal solution is characterized by the following seven-
equations system:
QEEF − (ξ − SF )
SIS
− 1
FIF
=
−1
U ′(Ct)
∫ ∞
t
FZ
FIF
U ′(Cs)e−ρ(s−t)ds (39)
QEEB =
1
BIB
(40)
1
SIS
=
−1
U ′(Ct)
∫ ∞
t
[
Φ′(Gs)Js − ϕG,seρs
]
e−(ζ+ρ)(s−t)ds (41)
QK − δ = ρ+ tgC,t (42)
BHBH
B
RB
BIB
+HBHB −
H˙BRB
HBRB
= ρ+ tgC,t (43)
EHEH
E
RE
EBBIB
+HEHE −
H˙ERE
HERE
= ρ+ tgC,t (44)
SHSH
S
RS
SIS
+HSHS −
H˙SRS
HSRS
= ρ+ tgC,t (45)
where Js =
∫∞
s QΩΩ
′(Tx)U ′(Cx)e−(m+ρ)(x−s)dx ≤ 0 and where ϕG,s is the Lagrange mul-
tiplier associated with constraint (31), thus satisfying ϕG,s ≥ 0, with ϕG,s = 0 for any s
such that Gs < G¯.
Proof. See Appendix A3.
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The interpretation of these conditions are almost the same than the ones formulated
in Proposition 1, excepted that, now, all the trade-offs are optimally solved. In other
respects, recall that, for a given set of public policies, a particular equilibrium is char-
acterized by conditions (32)-(38) of Proposition 1. This equilibrium will be said to be
optimal if it satisfies the optimum characterizing conditions (39)-(45) of Proposition 2. By
analogy between these two sets of conditions, we can show that there exists a single quadru-
plet {σB, σE , σS , τt}∞t=0 that implements the first-best. These findings are summarized in
Proposition 4 below.
Proposition 4 The equilibrium characterized in Proposition 1 is optimal if and only if
{σB, σE , σS , τt}∞t=0 = {σoB, σoE , σoS , τ ot }∞t=0, where σoi = 1− γi for i = {B,E, S}, and where
τ ot is given by:
τ ot =
−1
U ′(C)
∫ ∞
t
[
Φ′(G)
∫ ∞
s
QΩΩ′(T )U ′(C)e−(m+ρ)(x−s)dx− ϕGeρs
]
e−(ζ+ρ)(s−t)ds (46)
Proof. First, if τt = τ ot , then conditions (39) and (41) are satisfied by using (32) and (34).
Second, (40) and (42) are identical to (33) and (35), respectively. Third, if σi = 1− γi, for
i = {B,E, S}, then (43), (44) and (45) are identical to (36), (37) and (38), respectively.
Proposition 4 states first that, in any R&D sector, the optimal subsidy rate must be
equal to the share of the social value of innovations which is not captured by the market,
in order to entirely fill the gap between the private value and the social one. In section
4, according to several empirical studies, we will postulate that γi = 0.3, thus implying
σoi = 0.7 for i = {B,E, S}.
Second, the optimal trajectory of the carbon tax is given by (46). Since Ω′(Tt) < 0,
we have τ ot ≥ 0 for any t ≥ 0. This expression reads as the ratio between the marginal
social cost of climate change  the marginal damage in terms of utility coming from the
emission of an additional unit of carbon  and the marginal utility of consumption. In
other words, it is the environmental cost (in terms of final good) of one unit of carbon in
the atmosphere. This carbon tax can be expressed as the sum of two components. The
first one depends on the damage function and on the dynamics of the atmospheric carbon
stock and temperatures. It gives the discounted sum of marginal damages from t to ∞
coming from the emission of an additional unit of carbon at date t. The second one is only
related to the ceiling constraint through ϕG. It gives the social cost at t of one unit of
carbon in the atmosphere due to a tightening in the ceiling constraint. Then, the sum of
these two components is the instantaneous total social cost of one unit of carbon.
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Log-differentiating (46) gives us the optimal growth rate of the tax:
τ˙t
τt
= ζ + ρ+ tgC,t +
[ϕG,teρt − Φ′(Gt)Jt]∫∞
t [ϕG,se
ρs − Φ′(Gs)Js] e−(ζ+ρ)(s−t)ds
(47)
where ρ + tgC,t is equal to the interest rate rt. As in Goulder and Mathai (2000), the
dynamics of the optimal carbon tax results from the combination of three components.
The sum of the two first ones, i.e. the optimal appropriate discount rate ζ + rt in the
terminology of Goulder and Mathai, is unambiguously positive. The last component in (47)
reflects the full social cost of one unit of carbon, including both the direct marginal damage
and the social cost of the carbon ceiling, and is unambiguously negative. It generalizes
Goulder and Mathai's result to the case where a damage function and a carbon cap are
simultaneously considered. To sum up, we have two opposite effects meaning that the
carbon tax can either rise or fall over time9,10. In the following section, we illustrate this
point by depicting some monotonous or non-monotonous trajectories depending on the
relative weights of these effects. We will observe that, in the absence of carbon cap, the
last component is relatively weak with respect to the discount term, and thus the tax is
rising over time. Under ceiling constraint, this last term becomes stringent at the time the
ceiling is reached and the tax exhibits an invert U-shape trajectory.
4 Numerical results
4.1 Calibration and scenarios
Functional forms and calibration of the associated parameters are mainly provided by the
last version of DICE (Nordhaus, 2008) for the climate module, the final output, the social
preferences, the feedbacks on economic productivity from climate change, the total factor
productivity and demographic dynamics. The energy production and R&D characteriza-
tions come from ENTICE-BR (Popp, 2006a). For CCS technology, we use a specification
derived from the sequestration cost function used in DEMETER (Gerlagh and van der
Zwaan, 2006) and the calibration is updated from the IPCC special report on CCS (2005).
Others calibrations are provided by IEA data. All these details are referred to appendix
A4. The starting year is 2005.
To study the effects of policy instruments, we solve the equilibrium for various values
9In the case where the is only a ceiling and no damage, the tax is unambiguously rising over time as
long as the ceiling is not reached since ϕG,t = 0 ∀t such that Gt < G¯.
10For discussions about the optimal time path of the carbon tax, see also for instance Sinclair, 1994,
Ulph and Ulph, 1994, Farzin and Tahvonen, 1996, Hoel and Kverndokk, 1996, or Chakravorty et al., 2006.
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of τ and σ, by using the method described in Proposition 2. Note that we restrict the
scenarios to the case where, ∀i, γi = 0.3 and we will discuss later about the sensitivity of
the model to this parameter. Moreover, we consider only symmetric R&D policies, i.e. the
case where σi is independent of i.
11 The selected cases are listed in Table 1.
Scenario τt σ Comment
A 0 0 Laisser-faire
B τ sbt 0 Second-best tax, no R&D subsidy
C 0 0.7 R&D subsidies, no carbon tax
D τ ot 0.7 First-best optimum (without ceiling)
E τ550t 0.7 Optimum with a 550ppm cap
F τ450t 0.7 Optimum with a 450ppm cap
Table 1: Summary of the various scenarios for γi = 0.3, i = {B,E, S}
The benchmark case A refers to the laisser-faire equilibrium (BAU), in which neither
environmental tax nor R&D subsidies are set. In scenario B, we study the effect on the
equilibrium of an environmental tax by assuming zero σi's and by setting τt equal to its
second-best optimal level, τ sb.12 Similarly, in scenario C, we analyze the impact of R&D
subsidy rates by assuming τ = 0 and σ = 1− γ = 0.7.13 Scenario D refers to the first-best
optimum without carbon cap. Finally, two stabilization caps of 450 and 550ppm, which are
enforced owing to the specific tax trajectories τ550t and τ
450
t respectively, are also studied
(cases E and F).
4.2 Summary of results
We adopt the following notations to summarize the effects of the various policy combina-
tions. ∆X|A→D stands for the change in variable X due to a simultaneous increase of τ
from 0 to τ o and of the σ's from 0 to σo. These changes are illustrated in the following fig-
ures by a shift from the "scenario A" trajectories to the "scenario D" trajectories. ∆X|A→B
11We do not discuss here about the differentiated effects of the R&D subsidies. In a model with two
R&D sectors, Grimaud and Lafforgue (2008) show that cross effects are very weak, i.e. an R&D policy in
a particular sector has no crowding out impact on the other sector. With more than two R&D sectors, a
large number of scenarios can be considered, so that we let these developments for future research.
12Formally, it is the tax trajectory that maximizes social welfare given the constraint of zero research
subsidy, in the set of decentralized equilibria. For more details on second-best policies, see Grimaud and
Lafforgue (2008).
13Although the optimal subsidy rates are the same in scenarios C, D, E and F, the amount of subsidies
that are distributed among R&D sectors may differ, cf. equation (26).
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is the change of X due to an increase in τ from 0 to τ sb, given σ = 0. Symmetrically, given
τ = 0, ∆X|A→C denotes the change in variable X due to a simultaneous increase of the
σ's from 0 to σo. Finally, ∆X|D→E/F measures the change in X due to an increase in the
tax level (i.e. the introduction of a ceiling constraint), given the optimal enforcement of
the R&D policies. Table 3 provides the signs of the ∆'s for the main variables of interest
(where insignificant changes are depicted by ∼).
X ∆X|A→D ∆X|A→B ∆X|A→C ∆X|D→E
pF − − ∼ −
cF + + ∼ +
pB − ∼ − −
pE + + − +
VHB + ∼ + +
VHE − ∼ − ∼
VHS + + ∼ +
F − − −(weak) −
B + +(weak) + +
E − − + −
S + +(weak) ∼ +
HB + ∼ + +
HE + ∼ + ∼
HS + +(weak) ∼ +
RB + ∼ + +
RE + ∼ + ∼
RS + +(weak) ∼ +
QB + + + +
QF − − −(weak) −
QS + +(weak) ∼ +
G, T − − −(weak) −
Q − then + − then + + − then +
C + − then + + − then +
Table 2: Summary of economic policy effects
4.3 Numerical simulations
4.3.1 Optimal carbon tax and energy prices
As depicted in Figure 2, the first-best tax level starts from 49$/tC and follows a quite linear
increase to reach 256$/tC by 2105. The impossibility to enforce any research policy leads
to a second-best tax which is slightly higher than the first-best one, starting from 49.6$/tC
and rising to 275$/tC in 2105. The stabilization to 550 and 450 requires much higher tax
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levels. Starting from respectively 73 and 172$/tC, they increase sharply, reach some high
550$/tC and 735$/tC in 2075 and 2055, before declining once the concentration ceiling has
been reached. Naturally, the rate of increase of the carbon prices for the 450ppm target is
more rapid than that of the 550ppm case. These carbon prices prove slightly higher than
Nordhaus (2008) estimates for similar climate strategies.
In the case where a carbon target is introduced, the tax pace evolves non-monotonically
over time. Indeed, as long as the ceiling is not reached, the Lagrange multiplier ϕG
associated to the ceiling constraint is nil, and it becomes positive at the moment the
constraint is binding. Since the last component in equation (47) is strengthened by this
multiplier, the date at which the tax starts to decline and the date at which the carbon
stabilization cap is reached are closed.
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Figure 2: Optimal environmental taxes
Let us now analyze the effect of these tax trajectories on the prices of primary energies.
First, the fossil fuel market price increases only slowly due to the relative flatness of our
fossil fuel supply curve (see Figure 3-a). The implementation of a carbon tax reduces
the producer price which induces substantial rent transfers from extractive industries to
governments. In 2105, the revenues losses for the fossil energy producer amount to 55% and
52% when carbon caps are set at 550 and 450ppm, respectively. The concerns of oil-rich
countries towards stringent climate mitigation commitments has already been commented
and assessed in the literature (see for example Bergstrom, 1982, or Sinn, 2008). Moreover,
an increment in the R&D subsidy rates has no effect on the fossil fuel price, thus illustrating
the absence of crossed effects in this case.
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Figure 3: Fossil fuel and backstop prices
Simultaneously, introducing a carbon tax implies obviously a rise in the unit user cost
of the fossil fuel (cf. cF,t as defined by (7)), as observed by comparing the upper trajectories
of cases a to d in Figure 4. When carbon emissions are penalized, this creates an incentive
for energy firms to store a part of these emissions so that their cost of using fossil fuel
is obtained by adding two components to the fossil fuel market price: i) the tax on the
emissions released in the atmosphere and ii) the unit cost of CCS. Such a decomposition
is depicted in Figure 4. The incentives to use CCS devices, and thus the CCS unit cost,
are contingent to an high level of tax, or equivalently to a constraining carbon target.
Second, the decreasing market price of the backstop energy reveals largely affected by
the introduction of research subsidies, as can be seen from Figure 3-b. Such subsidies stim-
ulate backstop research, thereby increasing its productivity and then, reducing production
cost. They allow the backstop price to be cut by half by 2105. Moreover, two different
streams of trajectories can be identified. The higher ones are drawn for cases A and B, i.e.
when backstop R&D is not granted at all whereas the lower ones imply some positive σB.
Then, R&D subsidies mainly matter to explain a decrease in the backstop price whereas
the level of tax has only a weak depressive effect. Again, there is no crossed effect.
4.3.2 R&D
The effects of directed technical change can be portrayed by examining the effective value
of an innovation in both CCS and backstop R&D, VB and VS , as depicted in Figure 5.
14
14Results on energy R&D are less of interest and are not discussed here.
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Figure 4: Decomposition of the unit cost of fossil fuel use
a) Backstop R&D sector
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Figure 5: Effective innovation values in backstop and CCS R&D
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The behavior of these innovation values provide insights on the allocation and the
direction of R&D funding over time. First, the rising values demonstrate that the innova-
tion activity grows strongly during the century, with the exception of the laisser-faire case
which does not provide incentive for investing in CCS. Second, the increase in innovation
values is strongly governed by the stringency of climate policy. Clearly, the introduction
of a carbon ceiling induces the fastest increase in the effective value of innovations. Third,
the role of each mitigation option can be inferred from the time-path of both CCS and
backstop innovation values: CCS innovation value grows fast from the earliest periods,
reaches a peak by around 2075 and starts declining thereafter. On the contrary, the back-
stop innovation value keeps on rising over time, though at a slow pace initially. A simple
supply-demand argument is necessary to understand these behaviors. As the innovation
activity is growing fast, due to the urgent need of developing carbon-free energy supply,
and as the expected returns on CCS R&D are the highest initially because of relatively low
cost of technology improvement relative to the backstop, a "technology push" in favor of
CCS cause its innovation value to rise fast. In the longer run, backstop energy offers larger
deployment potential and thus takes over CCS investments. Its value then develops at a
faster pace while the CCS innovation is becoming less valued as its development shrinks.
These innovation values drive the R&D expenses flowing to each research sector. Figure
6 depicts such R&D investments for our major cases. In the polar laisser-faire case, hardly
any R&D budget is dedicated to research and CCS R&D is not financed at all. A similar
outcome occurs when an optimal tax is set while research subsidies are nil. When all
research subsidies are optimally set without carbon tax, R&D allowances do not profit the
CCS sector but mainly the backstop research sector that receives similar amounts to the
first-best optimal case. The first-best optimum restoration calls for a continuous increase
in R&D budgets that will mainly benefit the development of the backstop technology. By
the end of the century, overall R&D budgets will then have been multiplied by a factor of
roughly 10, amounting to slightly less than 1 billion USD. The energy efficiency sector and
the CCS sector receive respectively 13 and 17% of total R&D budgets in 2100. Looking
at the two stabilization cases, one notices drastic changes in R&D budgets allocation
and volumes. By the end of century, the overall R&D budgets exceed the ones obtained
when restoring the first-best solution. The necessity of curbing quickly the net polluting
emissions flow leads to substantial investments in CCS R&D that constitutes the cheapest
mid-term mitigation option. The more stringent the carbon target, the higher is the share
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of CCS R&D spending.
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Figure 6: Intensity of dedicated R&D investments (i.e. Ri/Q)
Two conclusions can be drawn so far. The implementation a carbon tax alone hardly
provides any incentive to proceed with R&D activities. In order to provide enough R&D
incentives, one needs first to correct for the externality by imposing a carbon tax and
second by subsidizing the research sectors. Moreover, short term investment in carbon-free
R&D, namely in CCS activities, can become relevant when imposing a stringent cap on
carbon accumulation, or equivalently, an higher level of tax.
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4.3.3 Impacts on the energy mix
Let us now turn to the development of primary energy use throughout the century. As
seen from Figure 7, the laisser-faire case induces a five-fold increase in energy use over the
century, driven by strong economic growth and the absence of policy restrictions. Because
of the lack of incentive (no carbon tax), the CCS technology is not utilized at all. In
addition, despite the fossil fuel price growth over time, the backstop technology remains
marginal because it is not competitive enough.
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Figure 7: Primary energy use
When moving from case A to case B, the implementation of the optimal carbon tax
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alone does not result in substantial carbon sequestration, and/or backstop penetration.
However, the fossil fuel share, and then the total primary energy use, are strongly reduced.
Symmetrically, the implementation of research policies alone (i.e. moving from case A to
case C) does not affect the fossil fuel use, but it slightly stimulates the backstop.
The simultaneous implementation of all optimal instruments (i.e. from case A to case
D) reveals a complementarity effect between research grants and carbon taxation. Indeed,
this scenario reinforces the effect of the tax on the fossil fuel use as observed in case B,
and it increases the fraction of carbon emissions that are effectively sequestered (up to 4%
of total carbon emissions in 2100). In addition, such a policy mix strengthens the role of
backstop.
Finally, the two stabilization cases induce radical changes in world energy supply be-
cause of the sharp increase of carbon prices. This results in strong reductions of fossil fuel
use, and thus of energy use, especially in the short-term where substitution possibilities
with carbon-free energy are not yet available. By 2050, energy demand will have been
reduced by 47% in the 550 ppm case, and by 60% in the 450 ppm case, as compared with
the unconstrained optimum. In addition, the large amounts of R&D budgets allocated
to CCS and backstop research sectors produce the expected benefits and allow for a deep
mitigation of climate change owing to the decarbonisation of the economy both via the
massive introduction of sequestration and via the backstop. When these carbon-free alter-
natives become economical, energy use rises again to reach similar levels to the laisser-faire
ones in 2100. By that time, the backstop energy supplies 46% and 42% of total energy
consumption. In the 550 and 450ppm cases, the CCS-based fossil fuel use accounts for
40% and 49% of total energy use in the 550 and 450ppm cases respectively. Therefore the
lower the carbon target, the higher is the share of emission-free fossil fuel use.
4.3.4 Climate feedbacks on output
The environmental consequences of alternative scenarios are represented in Figure 8-a. The
decentralized market outcome without any policy intervention involves a more intensive
energy use without CO2 removal and thus a faster carbon accumulation above to some
dangerous 1000ppm level (IPCC, 2007). The implementation of optimal instruments limits
the increase of atmospheric carbon accumulation to 800ppm by 2100. The implementation
of the sole optimal tax without further R&D subsidies leads a slightly higher level of
850ppm. Notice that the sole optimal subsidies without CO2 pricing just prove as inefficient
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from the environmental point of view.
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Figure 8: Atmospheric carbon concentration and damages
Figure 8-b shows the feedbacks of these atmospheric carbon concentrations on the
economic damages, as measured in terms of final output. Policy inaction would lead to
5% of gross world product (GWP) losses per year by 2100, which is slightly lower then the
forecasts established by Stern (2006). At the opposite, the implementation of the more
stringent carbon cap, i.e. 450 ppm, limits these damages to 1% of GWP by 2100. Between
these two extreme cases, the ranking of the trajectories among the various scenarios is the
same than the one depicted in Figure 8-a.
Figure 9-a gives the GWP time-development as a percentage of the one from the laisser-
faire case. The sole implementation of optimal subsidies improves the GWP at any date.
The implementation of the optimal tax alone reveal costly until the end of the century.
More importantly, setting economic instruments to their optimal values leads to further
GWP losses in the short and mid term compared to the market outcome without inter-
vention. In the longer run though, GWP increases significantly again and catches up the
laisser-faire trajectory by 2095, to reach even higher gains eventually, up to 8% in 2145. To
sum up: i) The presence of a carbon tax implies some GWP losses for the earlier genera-
tions, and some gains for the future ones. In other words, The long run economic growth is
always enhanced when climate change issue is addressed with a carbon tax. ii) The larger
the tax is, i.e. the lower the carbon ceiling is, the stronger the initial losses but also the
higher the long run gains.
Figure 9-b depicts the same kind of variations, but now applied to consumption, and
thus to welfare. Except for the optimal case D, this figure drives to the same conclusions
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than the previous one. However, we observe now that the simultaneous implementation
of the optimal public instruments allows to avoid the losses in consumption for the first
generations.
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Figure 9: Final output and consumption variations as compared with the laisser-faire
4.4 Sensitivity analysis
As the choice of the parameter γ, i.e. the rate of appropriability of the innovation value by
the market, is crucial, it is worth examining how a change in this parameter affects other
key variables. This last section is thus devoted to such a sensitivity analysis. Until now
this rate of appropriability was set at 0.3. We explore the implications of two alternative
values: 0.2 and 0.4. Table 3 summarizes the percentage deviation of some selected key
variables. Since the penetration of CCS technology is only modest in scenario A, we here
focus on scenario B. Given the model structure, an increase or a decrease by 10 percentage
points do not have symmetric effects on other variables but still produce some changes
in the same order of magnitude. More importantly, the percentage deviations increase
substantially over time. As seen from equations (14) and (15), the innovations values
(variables VHB and VHS ) are directly and largely affected by such parameter changes. And
therefore knowledge in backstop and CCS technologies (variables HB and HS) accumulates
much faster (for γ = 0.4). This is particularly true for CCS which plays a key role by the
middle of the century and requires fast improvement prior to its wide-scale deployment.
As a consequence, when parameter γ is set at 0.2, backstop use decreases by 10% in 2105
while CCS use decreases by 36%. Alternatively, when parameter γ is set at 0.4, backstop
and CCS use increase by 12% and up to 47% respectively within the same time horizon.
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γ = 0.2 γ = 0.4
X 2015 2055 2105 2015 2055 2105
τ sb 0,2 0,4 1,1 -0,2 -0,3 -1
pB 0,2 1,8 4,9 -0,2 -2 -5,3
VHB -34,8 -33,6 -31,9 34,5 34 30,4
VHS -37,8 -36,3 -35,6 42,2 38,7 38,2
F 0,1 0,4 0,8 -0,1 -0,5 -1
B -0,3 -3,8 -9,7 0,3 4,6 12,3
S -4,4 -21,3 -35,9 4,4 26,1 46,9
HB -0,2 -1,8 -4,7 0,2 2 5,6
HS -4,4 -21,4 -36,1 4,5 26,6 47,5∑
iRi -24,2 -40 -41,5 41,4 43,7 48,9
Table 3: Deviation (in %) of variable X when γ moves from 0.3 to 0.2 and 0.4, respectively,
for scenario B.
5 Conclusion
Our analysis primarily consisted in decentralizing the "top-down" ENTICE-BR model
(Popp, 2006a) in order to characterize the full set of equilibria. In addition to the backstop,
we also considered a second abatement possibility by adding to the original model a CCS
sector, together with an associated dedicated R&D activity. Simultaneously, in order
to account for further climate change damages that are not integrated in the damage
function, we imposed a cap on the atmospheric carbon accumulation. Since the economy
faces two types of market failures, global warming and R&D spillovers, the regulator uses
two types of public tools to correct them, a carbon tax and a subsidy for each R&D
sector. A particular equilibrium is associated with each vector of instruments. First, we
provided a characterization of this set of equilibria (Proposition 1). Second, we showed that
we can obtain any decentralized equilibrium as the solution of a maximization program
(Proposition 2). Third, we characterized the first-best optimum (Proposition 3) and we
showed that there exists a unique vector of policy tools that implements it (Proposition 4).
We calculated the optimal tax and subsidies analytically and we investigated their dynamic
properties. In the line with Goulder and Mathai (2000) and Ulph and Ulph (1994), we
verified that the optimal carbon tax is generally non-monotonic over time and follows an
inverted U-shaped time-path. It falls once the ceiling is reached.
In a second step, we have used a calibrated version of the theoretical model based on
DICE 2007 (Nordhaus, 2008), ENTICE-BR (Popp, 2006a) and DEMETER (Gerlagh et al.,
2006), to assess the environmental and economic impacts of various climate change policies.
29
In addition to the standard comparison of the first-best outcome with the laisser-faire, we
also provide some intermediate scenarios in which we analyze the separated impacts of the
policy tools. Our main findings are the following.
i) Our results do not exhibit significant crossed effects in the sense that the implemen-
tation of a carbon tax alone hardly provides any incentive to conduct R&D activities and
backstop production, when R&D policies used alone have only weak effects on the fossil
fuel and CCS sectors.
ii) The simultaneous use of the two types of tools reinforces the individual effects of
each one used alone, thus revealing complementarity between research grants and carbon
taxation.
iii) The first-best case (without ceiling) does not result in substantial carbon seques-
tration.
iv) A carbon cap reinforces the role of CCS as a mid-term option for mitigating the
climate change. In the longer term, if the policy-maker aims at stabilizing the climate, the
massive introduction of backstop energy is necessary.
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Appendix
A1. Proof of Proposition 1
Integrating (10) and using (9) and the transversality condition on Zt, we find:
ηt =
∫ ∞
t
FZ
FIF
e−
∫ s
0 rxdxds.
The first characterizing condition (32) is obtained by replacing η into (9) by the expression
above, and by noting that pF = QEEF − (ξ − SF )/SIS from (3), (4) and (6), and that
exp(− ∫ t0 rds) = U ′(C) exp(−ρt)/U ′(C0) from (24). Combining (3), (5) and (13) leads to
condition (33). Condition (34) directly comes from (6). Next, using (1) and (24), we
directly get condition (35). Finally, the differentiation of (18) with respect to time leads
to:
V˙i
Vi
= −H˙
i
Ri
H iRi
, i = {B,E, S} . (48)
Substituting this expression into (16) and using (18) again, it comes:
r = −H˙
i
Ri
H iRi
+ viH iRi , ∀i = {B,E, S} . (49)
We thus obtain conditions (36), (37) and (38) by replacing into (49) vB, vE and vS by
their expressions (20), (21) and (22), respectively.
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A2. Proof of Proposition 2
Let J be the discounted value of the Hamiltonian of the maximization program of Propo-
sition 2:
J = U(C)e−ρt + λ˜
{
Q[K,E[B(IB, HB), F (IF , Z), HE ], L,A,Ω]− C − δK −
∑
i
Ri
−
∑
j
Ij − τ [ξF (IF , Z)− S[F (IF , Z), IS , HS ]]
+∑
i
ν˜i(γi + σi)H i(Ri, Hi) + η˜F (IF , Z)
The associated first order conditions are:
∂J
∂C
= U ′(C)e−ρt − λ˜ = 0 (50)
∂J
∂IF
= λ˜[QEEFFIF − 1− τFIF (ξ − SF )] + η˜FIF = 0 (51)
∂J
∂IB
= λ˜(QEEBBIB − 1) = 0 (52)
∂J
∂IS
= −λ˜(1− τSIS ) = 0 (53)
∂J
∂Ri
= −λ˜+ ν˜i(γi + σi)H iRi = 0, i = {B,E, S} (54)
∂J
∂K
= λ˜(QK − δ) = − ˙˜λ (55)
∂J
∂Hi
= λ˜QEEHi + ν˜i(γi + σi)H
i
Hi = − ˙˜νi, i = {B,E} (56)
∂J
∂HS
= λ˜τSHS + ν˜S(γS + σS)H
S
HS
= − ˙˜νS (57)
∂J
∂Z
= λ˜[QEEFFZ − τFZ(ξ − SF )] + η˜FZ = − ˙˜η (58)
and the transversality conditions are:
lim
t→∞ λ˜K = limt→∞ ν˜iHi = limt→∞ η˜Z = 0 (59)
Replacing into (58) η˜ by its expression coming from (51), we find ˙˜η = −λ˜FZ/FIF .
Integrating this expression and using (50) and (59) implies:
η˜ =
∫ ∞
t
FZ
FIF
U ′(C)e−ρsds. (60)
Plugging this expression in (51) and using (50) again, one gets condition (32). Equations
(52) and (53) directly imply (33) and (34). Using (50) and (55), one gets (35). The
log-differentiation of (54) gives:
−ρ+ U˙
′(C)
U ′(C)
=
˙˜νi
ν˜i
+
H˙ iRi
H iRi
(61)
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Replacing into (56), λ˜/ν˜i and ˙˜νi/ν˜i by their expressions coming from (54) and (61), we
obtain conditions (36) and (37). The same calculation applied to (57) finally leads to (38).
A3. Proof of Proposition 3
Let H be the discounted value of the Hamiltonian of the optimal program:
H = U(C)e−ρt + λ
Q[K,E[B(.), F (.), HE ], L,A,Ω(T )]− C − δK −∑
i
Ri −
∑
j
Ij

+
∑
i
νiH
i(Ri, Hi) + ηF (.) + µG {ξF (.)− S[F (.), IS , HS ]− ζG}
+µT [Φ(G)−mT ] + ϕG(G¯−G)
The associated first order conditions are:
∂H
∂C
= U ′(C)e−ρt − λ = 0 (62)
∂H
∂IF
= λ(QEEFFIF − 1) + ηFIF + µGFIF (ξ − SF ) = 0 (63)
∂H
∂IB
= λ(QEEBBIB − 1) = 0 (64)
∂H
∂IS
= −λ− µGSIS = 0 (65)
∂H
∂Ri
= −λ+ νiH iRi = 0, i = {B,E, S} (66)
∂H
∂K
= λ(QK − δ) = −λ˙ (67)
∂H
∂Hi
= λQEEHi + νiH
i
Hi = −ν˙i, i = {B,E} (68)
∂H
∂HS
= νSHSHS − µGSHS = −ν˙S (69)
∂H
∂Z
= λQEEFFZ + ηFZ + µGFZ(ξ − SF ) = −η˙ (70)
∂H
∂G
= −ζµG + µTΦ′(G)− ϕG = −µ˙G (71)
∂H
∂T
= λQΩΩ′(T )−mµT = −µ˙T (72)
The complementary slackness condition and the transversality conditions are:
ϕG(G¯−G) = 0, with ϕG ≥ 0, ∀t ≥ 0 (73)
lim
t→∞λK = limt→∞ νiHi = limt→∞ ηZ = limt→∞µGG = limt→∞µTT = 0 (74)
From (63), we find that η = −µG(ξ − SF ) − λ(QEEF − 1/FIF ). Replacing this
expression into (70) and using (62) leads to the following differential equation: η˙ =
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−(FZ/FIF )U ′(C) exp(−ρt). Integrating this expression and using the transversality con-
dition (74), we obtain:
η =
∫ ∞
t
FZ
FIF
U ′(C)e−ρsds. (75)
Replacing into (63) λ, µG and η by their expressions coming from (62), (65) and (75),
respectively, gives us the equation (39) of Proposition 2. Equation (40) directly comes
from condition (64). From (62) and (72), we have: µ˙T = mµT −QΩΩ′(T )U ′(C) exp(−ρt).
Using (74), the solution of such a differential equation is given by:
µT =
∫ ∞
t
QΩΩ′(T )U ′(C)e−[m(s−t)+ρs]ds. (76)
Next, using the transversality condition (74), we determine the solution of the differential
equation (71) as:
µG =
∫ ∞
t
[
µTΦ′(G)− ϕG
]
e−ζ(s−t)ds (77)
where µT is defined by (76) and ϕG must be determined by looking at the behavior of the
economy once the ceiling have been reached. Condition (41) is then obtained by replacing
into (65) λ and µG by their expressions coming from (62) and (77), respectively. Log-
differentiating (62) with respect to time implies:
λ˙
λ
=
U˙ ′(C)
U ′(C)
− ρ = gC − ρ (78)
Condition (42) is a direct implication of equations (67) and (78). Finally, the log-differentiation
of (66) with respect to time yields:
λ˙
λ
=
ν˙i
νi
+
H˙ iRi
H iRi
. (79)
Conditions (43) and (44) come from (66), (68), (78), (79) and from (64) by using QEEB =
1/BIB . Similarly, condition (45) is obtained from (65), (66), (69), (78) and (79).
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A4. Calibration of the model
Based on DICE (Nordhaus, 2008), ENTICE-BR (Popp, 2006a) and DEMETER (Gerlagh,
2006), we use the following specified forms15:
Q(K,E,L,A,Ω) = ΩAKγEβL1−γ−β, γ, β ∈ (0, 1)
L = L0e
∫ t
0 g
Lds A = A0e
∫ t
0 g
Ads, gj = gj0e−djt, dj > 0, ∀j = {A,L}
E(F,B,HE) =
[
(F ρB +BρB )
ρH
ρB + αHH
ρH
E
] 1
ρH , αH , ρH , ρB ∈ (0, 1)
F (IF , Z) =
IF
cF + αF (Z/Z¯)ηF
, cF , αF , ηF > 0
B(IB, HB) = αBIBH
ηB
B , αB, ηB > 0
S(F, IS , HS) = κ(ξF )
[(
1 +
2ISHS
κ(ξF )
)1/2
− 1
]
, κ > 0
H i(Ri, Hi) = aiRbii H
φi
i , ai > 0, bi, φi ∈ [0, 1],∀i = {B,E, S}
W = v1
∫ ∞
0
L
(C/L)1−
(1− ) e
−ρdt+ v2, v1, v2 > 0
Ω(T ) =
[
1 + αTT 2
]−1
, αT > 0
Next, let us provide some calibration details here. According to IEA (2007), world
carbon emissions in 2005 amounted to 17.136 GtCO2. We retain 7.401 GtCeq as the initial
fossil fuel consumption, given in gigatons of carbon equivalent. In addition, carbon-free
energy produced out of renewable energy, excluding biomass and nuclear, represented 6%
of total primary energy supply. We thus retain another 0.45 GtCeq as the initial amount
of backstop energy use. We retain the Gerlagh's assumption for the cost of CCS that is
worth 150US$/tC. According to IEA (2006), the cumulative CO2 storage capacity is in the
order of 184 million tons per year. This value serves as a seed value for sequestration level,
S0, in the initial year, which is then fixed at 0.05 GtC. The cost of CCS sequestration and
the initial storage level allow for the calibration of the initial sequestration effort using the
following relation: IS,0/S0 =CCS cost, which implies IS,0 = 0.05GtC×150$/tC=7.5G$.
The total factor productivity has been adjusted so as to produce a similar pattern of
GWP development until 2100 to the one from DICE-08. The rates of return on both
R&D spending and knowledge accumulation have been set to 0.3 and 0.2 respectively so
as provide long term sequestration in line with IPCC (2007) projections. Without loss of
generality, the initial stock of knowledge dedicated to CCS is set equal to 1. Calibration
15We replace the cost function of fossil fuel and backstop from Popp (2006a) and the cost function
of sequestration from Gerlagh (2006) by their corresponding production functions in order to derive an
utility/technology canonical model. With our notations, these unit cost functions are, respectively: IF /F =
cF + αF
(
Z/Z¯
)ηF , IB/B = 1/(αBHηBB ), and IS/S = [1 + S/(2κξF )] /HS .
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of the other parameters come from DICE or ENTICE-BR. Table 4 below provides some
more details.
Param. Value Description Source
γ 0.3 Capital elasticity in output prod. DICE
β 0.07029 Energy elasticity in output prod. DICE
αT 0.0028388 Scaling param. on damage DICE
ρB Elasticity of subs. for backstop Calibrated
ρE 0.38 Elasticity of subs. for energy ENTICE-BR
αH 0.336 Scaling param. of HE on energy ENTICE-BR
F0 7.401 2005 fossil fuel use in GtC IEA
cF 400 2005 fossil fuel price in USD IEA
αF 700 Scaling param. on fossil fuel cost ENTICE-BR
ηF 4 Exponent in fossil fuel prod. ENTICE-BR
B0 0.45 2005 backstop use in GtC IEA
αB 1200 2005 backstop price in USD DICE
ηB Exponent in backstop prod. Calibrated
aB 0.0122 Scaling param. in backstop innovation ENTICE-BR
aE 0.0264 Scaling param. in energy innovation ENTICE-BR
bB 0.3 Rate of return of backstop R&D ENTICE-BR
bE 0.2 Rate of return of energy R&D ENTICE-BR
cS 150 Sequestration cost in 2005 USD/tC DEMETER
S0 0.05 2005 sequestration in GtC IPCC
QS,0 7.5 2005 sequestration effort in bill. USD IPCC
HS,0 1 2005 level of knowledge in CCS Calibrated
RS,0 0.5 2005 R&D investment in CCS in bill. USD Calibrated
aS 0.5 Scaling param. in CCS innovation Calibrated
bS 0.3 Rate of return of CCS R&D Calibrated
φS 0.2 Elasticity of knowledge in CCS innovation Calibrated
Φi 0.54 Elasticity of knowledge in innovation ENTICE-BR
 2 Elasticity of intertemporal subst. DICE
ρ 0.015 Time preference rate DICE
At Total factor productivity trend DICE
Lt World population trend DICE
Table 4: Calibration of the main parameters
38
